CHARACTER ISSUES


Daniel B. Klein with Harika Anna Barlett

Abstract

Admittedly, the range within which I acknowledge mental activity as competent and beyond which I reject as superstition, fatuity, extravagance, madness, or mere twaddle, is determined by my own interpretive framework.

—Michael Polanyi (1962, 318-19)

The accomplishments of Paul Krugman are prodigious. He has written or edited more than 25 books, 40 scholarly articles, and 750 columns at the New York Times, where he continues to write a twice-weekly column. Krugman received the John Bates Clark Medal in 1991 for his research in international trade. He taught at Yale, MIT, and Stanford prior to joining the faculty of Princeton. His eminence as a public-intellectual economist in the United States today is unsurpassed.

By providing regular commentary on American politics and policy, Krugman answers a vital calling. He admirably bypasses several common restraints. He leaves behind inhibitions about being “normative.” He is refreshingly outspoken. His discourse is plain and natural. Although his writings focus on economics, he does not let economics confine him. He takes up important issues even if economics is secondary, and in treating an issue he argues beyond the economics. More generally, he boldly assumes the role of one who takes up the most important things. He assumes the character of one who will do his best on whatever is of utmost importance. Individuals who assume that lofty role are rare, and still rarer are those who do it with any substantial success. Krugman is truly excep-

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Inherent in the mountain-top position is a kind of independence that often borders on madness. The thinker develops a unique and creative take on the world of affairs and culture. He can work to make it more or less responsible, but he can never step outside of himself to test and re-examine it from some other mountain top. Friends and colleagues will doubt some of the interpretive leaps, and their closeness may depend on their not thinking or commenting critically. In the crucial judgments that make his take characteristic, the thinker functions in a kind of isolation. Nor can anyone else establish her sensibilities as enlightened. The lofty will always remain somewhat distant and disconnected—a predicament indicated by how much Nobel economists disagree on policy. If there are enlightened answers to policy issues, then some of the Nobels are wrongheaded, and most likely the wrongness stems from delusion at deep levels of interpretation—of the world and of themselves.

Harika Barlett and I have made a complete review of Krugman’s New York Times columns 1997 through 2006—in all, 654 columns. Here I interpret his ideological sensibilities. I think they are quite wrongheaded, but that claim is not something I attempt to defend. I do not dispute isolated statements. My critique assesses the 654 NYT columns as a whole. I argue that the pattern of policy positions and arguments do not square with his purported concern for general prosperity and the interests of the poor. There are contradictions between what Krugman makes himself out to be and certain patterns of his policy statements. Some of the evidence lies in statements made. But the more important evidence lies in patterns of statements not made. Because Krugman assumes the role of addressing the most important things, because Barlett and I have made a complete survey of his NYT columns 1997 through 2006, and because the omissions are flagrant, I may treat omissions as evidence of Krugman’s ideological character and sensibilities.

Krugman is best interpreted as a committed social democrat and Democratic partisan. My main contention is that his social-democratic impetus sometimes trumps people’s interests, notably poor people’s interests. The tension surfaces in what Krugman has written about immigration and the threat it poses to the US welfare state. But the tension is found in his writings on several topics, and, importantly, in omissions in his writings. Krugman has almost never come out against extant government interventions, even ones that expert economists

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2 As a group, economists disagree on policy more than any other group of social scientists (Klein and Stern 2005, 286).
3 About the authorship of this paper and the appendix: I conceived of this project and invited Harika Barlett, a PhD student at my home institution of George Mason, to pursue it as course work. She collected, collated, abstracted, and managed the 654 NYT columns, she drafted what has turned into Appendix 2, and she did the extensive work contained in the Excel files. Because I am the senior author and because the main article is composed by me, I have used the first-person singular. The authorship of the “Taking Stock” Appendix is listed as Barlett and Klein.
Paul Krugman’s Character

seem to agree are bad, and especially so for the poor.

Of course, Krugman might reply that advancing the social-democratic ethos is necessary to improving well-being. Indeed, Krugman has suggested that, because of political dynamics, promoting the long-term interests of poor people depends on promoting a social-democratic ethos in the United States and, more particularly, the Democrats over the Republicans. I maintain that the tension between Krugman’s NYT corpus and economic betterment is strong enough to present problems either way. If Krugman would deny that there is significant tension, then he functions irresponsibly, in ways indicated below. If Krugman would admit that, to some extent, he is ready to sacrifice poor people’s interests for the sake of social-democratic values, then he has to admit conflict among relevant values and give up posturing to the effect that he has been a voice of unbiased research and has stood above any ideological interpretation of affairs.

The commitment to a social-democratic ethos as against poor people’s interests is by no means specific to Krugman. He typifies something much wider, the establishment sort of social-democratic mentality as manifested in the United States. The principal reason that I scrutinize Krugman is that he is brilliant, outspoken, relatively candid, industrious, and highly visible and influential. Investigating him is a way of investigating the larger cultural phenomenon. Like any vital thinker, Krugman opens himself to public examination. Moreover, he is known to impeach people’s motives, scruples, and psychology.

Krugman’s first NYT op-ed appeared in February 1997 and he wrote three more during the following years. Since the beginning of 2000, he has written a twice-weekly op-ed column. His 654 op-ed articles 1997 through 2006 are available electronically at the New York Times website (link). At the end of this paper is a link to an Excel file (Appendix 1) containing Krugman’s 654 articles, itemization of topics, quotations of policy suggestions and judgments, and notes about Krugman’s judgments.

Taking Stock of the 654 Columns

Paul Krugman’s 654 New York Times articles 1997 through 2006 covered the topics listed in Table 1. In addition to the Excel sheet linked as Appendix 1, Barlett and I have written an extensive review of the main themes and policy judgments found in the 654 columns—a simple “book report”—that helps to demonstrate the seriousness of our treatment of the material. We decided not to include that review in the present, already bulky, paper, but we provide it as a separate docu-

\[ 4 \text{ Examples of columns in which Krugman suggests that his position on a policy is affected by the resultant political dynamics include that of 3/31/06 (on immigration), 2/27/04 (on protectionism), and 6/10/05 and 2/27/06 (on inequality).} \]

\[ 5 \text{ Alternatively, one may go to the “Unofficial” Krugman archive (link).} \]
ment, linked as Appendix 2. It enhances this paper by showing more thoroughly that the content of the columns fit the interpretations given here.

**Table 1: Paul Krugman’s NYT Articles 1997 through 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxation/tax cuts, government programs, budget deficit, and fiscal responsibility</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary policy</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic, growth, and income inequality</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New economy and the stock market bubble</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization and free trade</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil prices</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointments/nominations of leaders at major financial institutions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security reform/privatization</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation/deregulation</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care system</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft’s monopoly case</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and accountability in government and business</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government's role in emergency management</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security, Iraq war and war against terrorism</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global warming and disinformation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>654</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Looking Out for the Poor**

Most every ideology maintains that it would serve the poor better than the status quo does. But that is not the same as saying that it claims to make poor people’s interests its sole or uppermost goal.

The liberal tradition of Adam Smith, Frédéric Bastiat, Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman maintains that a regime of private ownership and preponderant laissez-faire works out rather well for people regardless of their level of wealth or income. That tradition opposes any extensive welfare state. Do the classical liberals maintain that welfare-state
policies—in the US context, tax progressivity and programs like Social Security, Medicare, and free services like schools—are bad for the less well off? The answer is unclear. They might contend that welfare-state policies ill-serve the poor, for concomitant effects on morals, culture, political dynamics, incentives, and the service sectors involved. Like Smith, they generally believe that distributive justice involves virtues that should be pursued voluntarily.6

My perspective is classical liberal. I caution the reader not to slip into thinking that classical liberalism characterizes the foils Krugman sets against himself, chiefly Republican politicos. By and large, they do not represent classical liberalism, first, because they are politicos, and secondly, because they are Republicans.

The Left tradition, from Marx to the modern social democrats, also says its platform would better serve the poor. It has always highlighted distributonal conflict, the capitalists versus the workers, or the rich versus the poor. With the welfare state at the center of its agenda, modern social democracy is strongly committed to the idea that governmentally required redistribution advances the interests of the poor. But social democracy does not necessarily make that a supreme political value. It too pursues a wider, open set of sensibilities, including morals and culture, and, probably, in the end, tends to maintain that governmentally-required redistribution is a virtuous characteristic of the polity, a characteristic that will serve the moral and spiritual well-being of all classes of society, at least once they come to accept the idea.

**Krugman’s Concern for the Poor**

Krugman exhibits the leftist tendency to focus on distributional politics and to favor greater government-required redistribution. In an autobiographical essay, Krugman (1995) writes: “It was, in a way, strange for me to be part of the Reagan Administration. I was then and still am an unabashed defender of the welfare state, which I regard as the most decent social arrangement yet devised.”

Krugman also exhibits the leftist tendency of fashioning oneself as looking out for the poor. When Krugman criticizes some policy, he will likely say it hurts the poor and serves some group of rich. That refrain pervades Krugman’s articles on the income-tax cut, estate taxes, Social Security reform, corporate scandals, and emergency management, and it appears in many other topics, including the execution of the Iraq war. The following is characteristic: “the end result was a redistribution of the tax burden away from the haves toward the have-nots” (1/11/02).

And when Krugman favors some policy, he will likely say it advances the interests of the poor. About reforms in Britain he said: “But there’s no denying

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6 My belief that such was Adam Smith’s view is based on a wide array of things that Smith said and did not say, but in particular passages in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1790, 78-85, 175-76, 269-70, 327).
that the Blair government has done a lot for Britain’s have-nots. Modern Britain
isn’t paradise on earth, but the Blair government has ensured that substantially
fewer people are living in economic hell. Providing a strong social safety net re-
quires a higher overall rate of taxation than Americans are accustomed to …”
(12/25/06).

Krugman never proclaims that, for him, the supreme political value is ad-
vancing the interest of the poor. Still, that there might be tensions between help-
ing the poor and other cherished goals is something that Krugman almost never
acknowledges—although one exception, immigration policy, is found and treated
here. Krugman carries on as though his sensibilities coincide so neatly with that
goal that there is little tension to address. Concern for the poor, therefore, comes
across as emblematic of what Krugman stands for.

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ETHOS

I propose to interpret Krugman by recourse to some broader conjectures
about human penchants and the nature of certain political ideologies. The pres-
et investigation serves as a context for developing and testing those conjectures.

One such conjecture concerns the appeal of social democracy. I contend
that concern for the poor is much less central or primary than is usually claimed.
What I see as more primary is the making of identities and feelings of solidarity
and togetherness based on the mythology of cooperative, collective endeavor.
Acting together toward common ends and commonly experiencing the narrative
make for an approximation of common knowledge (Chwe 2001), an imagined
mutual coordination of sentiment, and an imagined community (Anderson 1991).
Part of the penchant is a yearning for sentiment to encompass all the people, at
least in the imagination—what I have elsewhere termed “the people’s romance”
(Klein 2005). Thus, the impetus to pursue collectively goal X is not so much the
achieving of X as the collective doings supposedly done to achieve X. The pen-
chant for encompassing sentiment by way of collective endeavor may well have
origins in the evolutionary environment (Hayek 1978; 1988). In some respects,
the classical-liberal tradition has sought to subdue the political and coercive assertion of such penchants. Liberalism (here and henceforth, in the original sense of
the term) is a resistance to ambitious schemes for collectivist endeavor and expe-
rience. Those with strong collectivist penchants or otherwise playing upon them
find that it is strategically effective to choose an X that thwarts resistance. An
optimal X would likely have the following features: first, a strong, immediate emo-
tional appeal, playing directly on the natural human impulses toward sympathy
and compassion; second, a plausible argument that the goal cannot be well met by
voluntary practices; and third, in as much as the political endeavor is not actually
effective in advancing X, a murkiness in assessing the effectiveness of the political
efforts to advance X. It is hard to imagine an official goal that better meets
these conditions than that of helping the least well off and otherwise protecting disadvantaged groups from supposed and ill-defined exploitations and injustices. I do not mean to suggest that any leader of the spirit ever thought in terms of such optimization, sat down to solve it, and arrived at the answer of redistribution and helping the disadvantaged. But we understand that, in the economy and in culture, sometimes circumstances adopt behaviors that correspond to how an optimizing agent would adapt to circumstances (Alchian 1950).

The “people’s romance” interpretation suggests, then, that, in the social democratic mentality, what is more primary than better conditions for the poor is the collective endeavors supposedly aimed toward that end. What is more primary than any equality achieved is the equalizing. What is more primary than any help rendered is the supposed helping. What is more primary than any education achieved is the supposed educating. It is the doing—collective and supposedly cooperative—that primarily animates the action.

One might look at the problem somewhat differently. Suppose that it were understood that the collectivist impulse could not be much subdued; suppose one had to act subject to the constraint that there was bound to be an official collective endeavor and an official X. Suppose further that it was a classical liberal who was to select and fix the X subject to such constraints. There may be no better solution, in his eyes, than the X that social democracy has selected and exalted. In that hypothetical, the official endeavors of social democracy may be testament of liberalism’s constrained success. Social democracy as we know it may be the form of the people’s romance with which liberalism is best able to co-exist.

I say the doing is “supposedly cooperative.” Collectivist penchants face serious challenges from liberal sensibilities against coercion and domination. That is why the social democratic mentality depends on precepts or tacit beliefs that deny or reinterpret those aspects of the agenda. There have emerged superstitions that hold that the rules of the polity are a matter of consent (“no one is forcing you to be here”), and that the government is the agent of the people. As Tocqueville (1840, 693-94) observed, democratic superstitions allow citizens to feel that they are above the government and yet subservient to and a part of a larger entity. Implicit are the ideas that the polity is an encompassing organization, the government is the appointed manager, and government rules are the terms and conditions of that organization, like the rules that employers specify in employment contracts or landlords specify in rental contracts. The state collectivity is overlord, the true owner of all property within the polity. Thus, the ugly aspects of the social democratic vision are interpreted away. People who choose to be in the polity are agreeing to the rules of the organization and at least passively choosing to cooperate in its goals.

Franklin Roosevelt personified and now symbolizes the American mentality

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7 Elsewhere I explore whether advancing liberty can function as such an X, and conclude in the negative (Klein 2005, 24-31).
of state collectivism. In his first inaugural address he expressed it nicely:

If we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline. We are, I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and property to such discipline, because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger good. I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army. … I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.8

**Krugman Propounds a Social-Democratic Political Ethos**

Krugman does not wax at length about the moral and cultural virtues of statist endeavor, but time and again in passing remarks he propounds a social-democratic political ethos.

Krugman idolizes Franklin Roosevelt, and clearly for his assertion of government as the leading force in society: “FDR’s mission in office was to show that government activism works” (9/16/05). “Franklin Roosevelt, in his efforts to combat economic woes, was famously willing to try anything until he found something that worked” (3/12/04). Krugman extols FDR’s “huge expansion of federal spending, including a lot of discretionary spending by the Works Progress Administration,” and notes that the administration avoided corruption (9/16/05). Krugman also extols the centralization of powers formerly exercised by decentralized governments (9/16/05).

The goal was to help the have-nots. “Franklin Roosevelt favored the interests of workers” (8/18/06). Krugman regards “the public safety net FDR and LBJ created” to be one of the great defining achievements of America (5/13/05). “Moderates and liberals want to preserve the America FDR built” (2/8/05). But the appreciation goes beyond the creation of the welfare state. Krugman celebrates the overcoming of inhibitions: “The reason World War II accomplished what the New Deal could not was simply that war removed the usual inhibitions. Until Pearl Harbor Franklin Roosevelt didn’t have the determination or the legislative clout to enact really large programs to stimulate the economy. But war made it not just possible but necessary for the government to spend on a previously inconceivable scale, restoring full employment for the first time since 1929” (9/13/02).

Krugman writes of George W. Bush: “Indeed, in crucial respects he’s the anti-FDR. President Bush subscribes to a political philosophy that opposes gov-

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8 Quoted at p. 41 in Schivelbusch (2006), which I strongly recommend.
ernment activism—that’s why he has tried to downsize and privatize programs wherever he can” (9/16/05). Krugman explains the motives of the anti-FDR forces: Social insurance programs “protect Americans against the extreme economic insecurity that prevailed before the New Deal. The hard right has never forgiven FDR (and later LBJ) for his efforts to reduce that insecurity, and now that the right is running Washington, it’s trying to turn the clock back to 1932” (2/8/05).

Again, the lynchpin is the magical role made of democracy. It determines and articulates the collectivity’s uppermost decisions, sets the collective goals, and demonstrates that the politician, even the President, is subservient to the ordinary citizen. In an election-day column in 2004, Krugman quotes a correspondent from Florida: “To see people coming out—elderly, disabled, blind, poor; people who have to hitch rides, take buses, etc.—and then staying in line for hours and hours and hours. Well, it’s humbling. And it’s awesome. And it’s kind of beautiful.”

Krugman follows:

Yes, it is beautiful. I always get a little choked up when I go to the local school to cast my vote. The humbleness of the surroundings only emphasizes the majesty of the process: this is democracy, America’s great gift to the world, in action.

But over the last few days I’ve been seeing pictures from Florida that are even more majestic. They show long lines of voters, snaking through buildings and on down the sidewalk: citizens patiently waiting to do their civic duty. Those people still believe in American democracy; and because they do, so do I. … [I]t’s already clear that the people of Florida—and, I believe, America as a whole—have refused to give in to cynicism and spin.

Far from being discouraged by what happened in 2000, they seem to realize more than ever—and better than those of us in the chattering classes—what a precious thing the right to vote really is. And they are determined to exercise that right. …

Regardless of their politics, most Americans understand that this is a crucial election, and that never before has their vote mattered so much for the nation’s destiny. … [T]he more people vote, the more vital is our democracy. … By coming to the polls, citizens are literally giving a vote of confidence in American democracy. And in so doing, they are proving themselves wiser than some of those they elected. … Above all, though, I want to see democracy vindicated, and the stain of 2000 eradicated, by a clean election in which as many people as possible get to cast their votes, and have those votes counted.
And all the evidence says that’s what the American people want, too.
May all of us get our wish. (11/2/04)

Thus, Krugman openly displays the aesthetic sensibility served by democratic rites and superstitions. Although Krugman often lambastes sitting politicians, he affirms the validity and functionality of the democratic process: “The truth is that the government delivers services and security that people want. Yes, there’s some waste—just as there is in any large organization” (12/29/06).

The rules of the polity-organization are forged in the “social contract.” To explain what the Social Security debate is all about, Krugman tells a fable:

There once was a land where people lived only two years. In the first year they worked; in the second year they lived off their personal savings.

There came a time when the government decided to help out the elderly. So it instituted a system called Social Security. Every young, working individual would pay a tax, which would be used to pay benefits that same year to each older, retired individual. (10/11/00)

Krugman explains that “Social Security has never been run like a simple pension fund. It’s really a social contract” (3/5/02). Then, he continues, “an ambitious politician came along, declaring: ‘It’s your money!’” and seeking to renege on the contract (10/11/00).

The same social-democratic worldview is evident when Krugman writes of health insurance: “If Truman had succeeded [in creating a national health insurance system], universal coverage for everyone, not just the elderly, would today be an accepted part of the social contract” (6/13/05). Later, Medicare, a compact covering a portion of the population, was achieved: “America decided 35 years ago to guarantee health care to older citizens” (9/10/00).

The presuppositions extend not merely to the tax take and government programs. In order for social democrats to view the minimum wage law and myriad similar regulations as NOT coercion, as NOT incursions on freedom, they must hold that such rules are like the contractual rules within an organization, which implies that all resources are the property of the state or people. For example, Krugman quotes approvingly one member of the finance industry: “Financial markets are as much a social contract as is democratic government.” Krugman adds, “Yet there is a growing sense that this contract is being broken” (5/17/02).

A corollary is that individual liberty or freedom is not a meaningful concept. To acknowledge individual liberty would be to acknowledge bona fide individual ownership of self and other resources. By searching on the terms “freedom” and
“liberty,” I confirm that, with but one exception\textsuperscript{9}, in the 654 columns Krugman never accords any validity to those concepts—indeed, he occasionally slights them (e.g., 7/4/05). And when he advocates what liberals would regard as contraventions of the principles, for example, when he advocates an increase in the minimum wage (7/14/06), he says nothing to indicate that it constitutes a restriction on freedom of contract and hence individual liberty. The minimum wage is a rule one agrees to in being in the organization.

**Social Democracy and the Poor**

Social democracy—fashioned as “liberalism” in the United States—has received a lot of good press. One reason is that the press through the twentieth century became increasingly dominated by social democrats, as did most other political and cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{10} They have generally validated, endorsed, and celebrated the image of social democracy as a system that serves the poor and helps the disadvantaged. Social democracy certainly deserves some of that image. But the genuine aspects of the image should not blind us to the ways in which social democracy works systematically against the poor. Here I highlight some that relate to Krugman’s columns.

- Its myths and superstitions are perennially opposed by the Locke-Smith conceptions of ownership, liberty, and coercion. In consequence, social democracy cannot but help to work to disparage and subvert such notions—it is necessary to the overcoming of classical-liberal “inhibitions.” The result, especially since the 1930s, has been the great attenuation of such restraints and the corresponding unbridling of statist impulses in the domain of policy. Two kinds of impulses deserve special mention: first, impulses that appeal to our innate collectivist penchants; second, impulses to garner special privileges for one’s own group (sometimes called rent-seeking). Often, the result is a multi-lateral struggle for powers and immunities—if only to try to avoid being tread upon by the powers unleashed. The interventions that have spilled out are often extremely bad. They often curtail betterment generally—and, by the power of compounding, a diminished growth rate will mean significantly diminished “poor” living standards in a soon actual and thereafter ever lesser than would have been henceforth. But very often the

\textsuperscript{9} The single exception pertains to a restriction outside of the American polity: “the Argentine government has imposed drastic restrictions on economic freedom. Most notably, residents are now limited to withdrawing $1,000 per month from their bank accounts” (12/11/01).

\textsuperscript{10} Those developments have not, however, been principally guided by an invisible hand. In general, cultural development does not exhibit strong invisible-hand properties, particularly when coercion plays a large role. One reason is that, in the contest between statism and liberalism, the latter, being a philosophy of voluntarism, is much less inclined or able to use government to gain cultural power and to assert its ideas and values. The plainest illustration is schooling, both K-12 and higher education.
badness can be understood in terms of injury now, especially to the poor.

- But, reading the social democrats, you’d scarcely know it. They need to affirm that interventions express the collective will. The democratic process, though imperfect and subject to abuse, basically works. The implication is that status-quo interventions tend to be in the neighborhood of the right policy. Thus, any longstanding intervention enjoys a presumption of rightness. The burden of proof is thrown onto anyone who would challenge status-quo interventions. Interventions that hurt society in general and the poor in particular, such as the public school system or “consumer protection” restrictions, at least have the passive support of social democrats. They sometimes push for new interventions in health care, etc., but they only rarely call for repeal or liberalization of existing interventions—although, I admit, that the more “progressive” sort (as opposed to the more establishment sort) sometimes favors liberalization in drugs, prostitution, immigration, and a few other issues, and often strongly opposes military actions. For most social democrats, the spirit of abolitionism is alien and offensive. Indeed, in his allusions to the times of FDR, the 1950s, and the Clinton years, Krugman’s attitude is often nostalgic and complacent (e.g., 9/8/06).

- Besides being complicit in extant interventions, social democrats are especially partial toward government programs to inculcate the mythology of “the people” engaged in collective endeavor. Social Security is us taking care of us. It is a part of the collectively produced “social safety net,” which safeguards all of us in all of our activities, thus spanning life within the polity. But aside from redistributive policies, there are programs like the government ownership and operation of schools, the postal system, transit systems, and so on that will generally have the support of social democrats for their mythological properties of collective endeavor and experience. And, inversely, as the people’s romance depends on the focalness of government power, social democrats often show jealousy and hostility towards independent centers of cultural power and experience, from private schooling to shopping malls to private corporations and private concentrations of wealth, and discomfort with private means of withdrawing from the collective experience, such as home schooling and private automobility. The cultural greediness of social democracy often has policy consequences that especially hurt the poor, consequences that social democrats rarely acknowledge.

- The people’s romance defines “the people” by the polity. Souls across the border just don’t count for much, even though much poorer than Americans.

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11 Elites in general tend to affirm that the way things are basically works—maybe because their selfhood and elite status rest on such structures and their legitimation.
Although social democrats generally favor free trade and globalization, they are much less comfortable with any significant liberalization in immigration. They might say that it harms poor working Americans. More significantly, it jeopardizes the popularity, if not the fiscal viability, of the welfare state. In general, letting the concern for the poor extent beyond the border would blur the myths of encompassing endeavor and experience and would upset the justifications based on democracy, since any notion of “the people” as all humanity would mean that souls beyond the border are “disenfranchised.” The key myths would unravel.

Also, there are cultural consequences. The people’s purpose according to social democracy—raising up the poor, helping the disadvantaged, making conditions and opportunity more equal—are degrading in the way they categorize people into “rich” and “poor” and demeaning specifically to those categorized as “the poor,” “the have-nots,” etc., as they are presumed to be highly dependent on statist sustenance. Rather than calling, as Smith did, for more liberty “to enable [the people] to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves,”12 social democrats almost never call for more liberty but rather call for renewed collective efforts.

**Krugman and Poor Non-Americans**

During the 1990s, Krugman wrote regularly for Slate. His Slate writings, earlier books such as *The Accidental Theorist* (1998), and earlier NYT writings often communicated basic liberal economics. By the end of 2006, however, the long experience of writing for habitual NYT readers and receiving their feedback had worsened his discourse. His NYT writings show increasing reliance on partisan prejudice and emotion, pandering to collectivist penchants, and statism on the issues. One topic evincing such deterioration is immigration.

In 2000 and 2001 Krugman favored immigration without much qualification: “I am one of those people who feel that immigration is a good thing—most of all for the immigrants, but good for America too” (5/23/01). The view rested principally on “mundane economic arguments” (5/23/01), but also on American demographics (4/16/00; 6/21/00; 5/23/01). Krugman likened the anti-immigration movement to the ignorant anti-globalization movement and suggested that racism lies behind anti-immigration attitudes (5/23/01). Similarly, Krugman had earlier criticized anti-immigration activists and protectionists as “working against the interests of most of the world’s poor” (5/21/2000; 4/22/01).

By March 2006, his view had changed: “the crucial divide isn’t between legal and illegal immigration; it’s between high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants. High-skilled immigrants—say, software engineers from South Asia—are, by any

12 Smith (1776, 428).
criterion I can think of, good for America. But the effects of low-skilled immigration are mixed at best” (3/31/06). He comes to the following policy conclusion: “Realistically, we’ll need to reduce the inflow of low-skill immigrants” (3/27/06).

Krugman’s illiberalism flows from the social-democratic ethos. He now minimizes the spontaneous benefits of liberal immigration: “First, the net benefits to the US economy from immigration, aside from the large gains to the immigrants themselves, are small” (3/27/06). In that column devoted to immigration, the only recognition of the benefits to the immigrants is that “aside.” The remainder speaks of jeopardy to the American people. “Because Mexican immigrants have much less education than the average U.S. worker, they increase the supply of less-skilled labor, driving down the wages of the worst-paid Americans.” In consequences, “many of the worst-off native-born Americans are hurt by immigration—especially immigration from Mexico.” The competition that Mexican immigrants pose to low-skilled Americans upsets the romance of helping America’s “have-nots” and of equalizing American conditions.

But labor competition is not Krugman’s main concern. “[M]odern America is a welfare state, even if our social safety net has more holes in it than it should—and low-skilled immigrants threaten to unravel that safety net” (3/27/06). Immigrants “increase the demand for public services, including health care and education. Estimates indicate that low-skilled immigrants don’t pay enough in taxes to cover the cost of providing these services” (3/31/06). But the fiscal burden is not large. “[T]he political threat that low-skill immigration poses to the welfare state is more serious than the fiscal threat” (3/27/06).

Politics “with high immigration tend, other things equal, to have less generous welfare states than those with low immigration” (3/31/06). The mechanism he highlights is that most low-skilled immigrants are not citizens and cannot vote: “a political system in which many workers don’t count is likely to ignore workers’ interests: it’s likely to have a weak social safety net and to spend too little on services like health care and education” (3/31/06). Another mechanism, not made explicit by Krugman, might be that if Americans believe that immigrants consume the benefits, they will be less favorable toward welfare statism.

Deeper ideological concerns become apparent as Krugman discusses the political nature of the problem. Once inside the country, immigrants become among us, a part of the political organization. “Since we aren’t going to deport more than 10 million people, we need to integrate those people into our society” (3/31/06). “Basic decency requires that we provide immigrants, once they’re here, with essential health care, education for their children, and more” (3/27/06). But they are “disenfranchised.”

A guest-worker program, even with a clear route to citizenship, would be a “violation of democratic principles” because “it could create a permanent underclass of disenfranchised workers” (3/31/06; 3/27/06). Democracy is violated when Roberto, the Mexican immigrant, works and lives but does not vote in the
Paul Krugman’s Character

United States. “Surely this would be a betrayal of our democratic ideals, of government of the people, by the people” (3/31/06).

Allowing Roberto that option weakens the superstitions that the people are defined by the polity, that they stand above the government by virtue of participating in elections, that they universally express their collective will, and that the resultant policies constitute a social contract. Allowing entry and existence within the United States to a disenfranchised Roberto “betrays our moral and democratic principles” (3/27/06). So long as Roberto neither works nor lives in the United States, it matters not that he is disenfranchised, because he is not a soul who counts as being among “the people.”

Krugman’s focus on voting, as opposed to, say, freedom, health, wealth, opportunity, the pursuit of happiness, or cultural cross-fertilization, verges on what Bryan Caplan (2007) has termed “democratic fundamentalism.” Krugman writes, “we already have a large disenfranchised work force, and it’s growing rapidly. The goal of immigration reform should be to reverse that trend” (3/31/06).

Roberto is typically much poorer than “poor” Americans. He wants the option of working and living in the United States. That option might be extremely important to him and his family. Here and elsewhere, the people’s romance trumps concern for the poor.

Krugman Falls Silent: Liberalizations That Would Significantly Help the Poor

Krugman’s 654 columns quite regularly advocate or at least vaguely support government intervention. Examples relate to the following policy areas: immigration, the minimum wage, unions, health care provision, health insurance, Sarbanes-Oxley, financial markets, telecommunications regulation, media ownership, energy conservation and fuel efficiency, disaster insurance, disaster response, electricity provision, foreign aid, global warming, and of course taxation and the “social safety net” programs. (Appendix 1 details Krugman’s support for intervention.)

Krugman has claimed, “I’m not an opponent of markets. On the contrary, I’ve spent a lot of my career defending their virtues” (11/14/05). The 654 columns provided Krugman ample opportunity to be pro-intervention on some issues and pro-liberalization on others.

A comprehensive analysis of the 654 columns shows, however, that Krugman has really sided with liberalization only on the following issues: rent control (6/7/00); US agricultural subsidies (5/7/02); international trade (e.g., 3/8/02; 3/24/02; 6/11/02; 11/28/03); mildly on high-tech anti-trust enforcement including the Microsoft case (often arguing that the government just cannot do anything to improve matters, e.g., 7/12/00; 10/22/00; 6/24/01; 7/1/01; 11/4/01); ethe-
nol mandates and subsidies/tax breaks (6/25/00); NASA manned-space flight (it is only the manning of ships that he opposes; 2/4/03); European labor-market restrictions (3/29/00; 5/3/00); and the Terry Schiavo case (3/29/05).13

Thus, Krugman has sided with liberalization only rarely. And when it comes to established interventions, there are only two cases, rent-control and agricultural subsidies, each treated in but a single column, on which Krugman has ever advocated liberalization. Moreover, since the close of 2002 there has been no new and significant espousal of liberalization.

A great many policies in the United States contravene Smith’s natural liberty. They are often so baneful on net, and so clearly so, that anyone, almost regardless of his or her professed values, ought to be strongly opposed to at least a goodly number of them. Yet the public culture presumes rightness in the status quo. That convention might arise in part from difficulties in agreeing on which policies should be opposed. Still, a decided opposition to many existing interventions should emanate from any individual who is informed and forthright in discourse. Yet such individuals of any significant prominence are rare. We understand why politicos refrain from criticizing the status quo. We are less candid about the extent to which very similar mechanisms apply more generally—pundits and intellectuals, too, will usually lose out on any significant prominence or establishment success if they openly challenge the presumption of the status quo. Public culture in the United States is itself highly politicized and taboo-ridden. Institutions such as the conventional media, K-12 schooling, and academia, and, more generally, the public culture, coordinate on a broad groupthink centered on the status quo and enmeshed in “liberal versus conservative” memes, which relate closely to the contest between the two parties. Reiteration, indoctrination, and practice turn it into a pervasive mentality, making a self-reinforcing, path-dependent cultural system. Anyone who operates accordingly is, regardless of leanings this way or that, abiding by a conventional mentality or sensibility. Krugman illustrates the status-quo mentality, as do most prominent pundits and intellectuals. Krugman’s failure to challenge and oppose status-quo interventions is typical, but, again, it flies in the face of his professed concern for the poor, his pretensions of forthrightness, and his pretensions of standing above ideological commitments and biases.

This part of my critique turns especially on two things: First, because Krugman has long held the station of twice-weekly NYT columnist, and because he presents himself as a free-ranging public intellectual, it is reasonable to say that Krugman not merely is free to address what he thinks are the most important policies but even is expected to do so. He had ample opportunity to write now and then on whatever policies he thinks especially deserving of criticism, particularly for hurting the poor. Second, the review that Harika Barlett and I have made

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13 Additionally, in a column on aid to Katrina victims, Krugman supported the issuing of housing vouchers over public housing (10/3/05), and criticized the administration for trying to cut the housing voucher program.
of the 654 columns is comprehensive. We speak authoritatively on what Krugman has not said in those columns.14

Here I examine Krugman’s silence first by raising a few noteworthy cases and then by examining Krugman’s record on a list of 57 potential federal liberalizations and privatizations.

**K-12 Schooling.** Krugman speaks often of equality and mobility, and relates them to education: “the way to mitigate inequality is to improve our educational system” (2/27/06). He has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the school system, writing, “one key doorway to upward mobility—a good education system, available to all—has been closing. More and more, ambitious parents feel that a public school education is a dead end” (11/22/02), and, “public schools for those who can’t afford to live in the right places have gotten worse” (5/21/00). There are few issues of more vital importance, especially to the poor, than schooling. Yet, remarkably, in 654 columns Krugman himself never says anything about why the public school system performs poorly or how to improve matters. I would contend that the poor performance of the public school system is easily explained by basic principles—the lack of choice, responsiveness, competition, private ownership, entrepreneurship, and so on. Moreover, the system lacks the cooperative spirit that comes especially from bottom-up voluntarism. Improvement is elementary: shift subsidization to the user and allow private schools to enter and displace government schools. A system of school vouchers would continue to subsidize any positive externality of education and would beat the present socialist system in nearly every dimension—quality, innovation, cooperation, and helping the poor. But there is one dimension in which the socialist system beats a voucher system: the people’s romance and the inculcation of statist norms and attitudes. Government schooling—“common” in the sense of encompassing and universal—is one of the primary collectivist endeavors of the people’s romance. The 13-year experience accustoms children and teenagers to government power and focalness. And the public schools greatly influence their ideas and beliefs. Surely it is for reasons such as these that Krugman falls silent on school vouchers. The only mention is the following: “And the administration continues to believe that ‘financialization’ is the way to go on just about everything, from school vouchers to Social Security” (8/17/01). It is hard to interpret silence, but presumably Krugman remains loyal to the public school system. As with immigration, the people’s romance trumps concern for the poor.

**Interventions that eliminate lower rungs from the economic ladder.** A common trope in liberal economics, developed notably by Walter Williams (1984), is that a free system offers abundant opportunity to gain work experience, make contacts, and discover and develop own abilities, all constituting an “economic

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14 Besides cataloging and analyzing every column in the Excel file linked at Appendix 1, we have confirmed our statements by putting all 654 columns into a single Word document easily searchable on statement keywords.
ladder,” but that many interventions eliminate low rungs of the ladder by privileging certain parties against low-positioned would-be competitors. Rich kids have family support and social capital to lift them up and grab hold of the remaining rungs; poor kids often do not. The leading example of such rung-removing intervention is occupational licensing, which directly affects more than 20 percent of US workers (Kleiner 2006). It is a prime example of banned-till-permitted “consumer protection” regulation. Economic analysis of the policy is extensive and quite devastating—approached from any angle, it tends to show that government’s one advantage and unique capability, the power of coercion, really does nothing to assure quality and safety that voluntary practices and tort law, working through myriad channels, cannot, yet has large ill consequences. Occupational licensing, it has been argued, reduces availability, selection, innovation, and quality received by consumers, while increasing prices and incomes of practitioners (Kleiner 2006). It makes it harder for poor people to mount and ascend the economic ladder and, by shifting labor supply functions, depresses wages in fields not subject to licensing. Other interventions that remove low-positioned rungs include union privileges and the minimum wage, but occupational licensing is the most significant in that economists who study and judge the policy mostly reach a conclusion in favor of liberalization (on medical licensing, see Sorel 2004). Yet Krugman never addresses the policy. In fact, in all of his utterances about the tribulations of the poor, he never points to any existing intervention as a livelihood obstacle. When Krugman writes, “Can anything be done to spread the benefits of a growing economy more widely?,” he makes but one suggestion: “A good start would be to increase the minimum wage” (7/14/06).

The Food and Drug Administration. There is probably no set of federal policies of greater moment to the public’s health than Congress’s blanket ban on new drugs and medical devices and the assignment to the Food and Drug Administration to consider whether to permit them and what manufactures may say about them. Scholarly evaluation of the system has been extensive. Many studies credibly argue that the existing system, relative to a more liberal system, is extremely injurious to the public’s health. Virtually all economists who express a policy judgment favor liberalization, including Gary Becker, Milton Friedman, Sam Peltzman, Peter Temin, and Kip Viscusi. Again, the analysis is quite devastating, and in just the ways that an economist should expect for a banned-till-permitted “consumer protection” system. Some of the social losses are loosely identifiable and even quantifiable, and can be temperately described as tremendous and tragic. As with most regulatory failures, the damage arguably falls disproportionately on the poor, who are least able to cope, for example by traveling abroad for banned therapies or working their way to “compassionate use” access.

15 For a review of the scholarly literature on the FDA, and a compendium of 22 economist quotations favoring liberalization, see the extensive website www.FDAReview.org (Klein and Tabarrok 2002).
But nowhere\(^\text{16}\) in the 654 columns does Krugman address the issue.\(^\text{17}\) Indeed, he wrote, “we need to put aside our anti-government prejudices and realize that the history of government interventions on behalf of public health, from the construction of sewer systems to the campaign against smoking, is one of consistent, life-enhancing success” (7/8/05). Krugman might be ignorant of the economic analysis of banned-till-permitted systems in drugs and occupational licensing, but those issues are so momentous and the arguments for liberalization so compelling that we justly suspect deep-seated bias.

**On Liberalization, Krugman Is Called Out on Strikes.** Schooling, occupational licensing, and the FDA are just a few of the fat pitches that Krugman ignored. The number of missed opportunities to call for liberalization is practically endless. Why doesn’t Krugman give half a column to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, which kills many and prevents poor people (and non-poor people) from selling a kidney? Why doesn’t he protest restrictions on reproductive solutions and adoption services, which cause many couples to remain childless and unhappy? Why doesn’t he write about drug prohibition, which massively incarcerates poor people and spreads violence and disorder particularly in poor neighborhoods? Why doesn’t he protest, in addition to rent-control, other major housing and land-use restrictions that drive up housing costs? Why doesn’t he call for the liberalization of transit services including shuttle vans, express buses, taxis, and spontaneous ride-share systems, which would reduce costs, enhance mobility, and add rungs to the economic ladder?

A list of 57 potential federal liberalizations and privatizations were presented to the economics faculty of George Mason University, who were asked to rank them in terms of their deservingness of reform discussion in the *Economic Report of the President*. Details are contained in Klein and Clark (2006, 477-481).\(^\text{18}\) The 57 potential federal reforms included 35 liberalizations and 22 privatizations. The top ten liberalizations were: diminish trade restrictions, reduce agriculture subsidies and regulations, reduce FDA restrictions, reduce anti-trust enforcement and restrictions, reduce regulations on healthcare facilities and professionals, repeal restrictions on competitive mail delivery, liberalize drug prohibition, repeal laws that require banks to keep tabs on customers and report activity to the government, revisit Sarbanes-Oxley, and liberalize anti-discrimination laws.

We examined the 654 columns for treatment of the 57 potential reforms.

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\(^\text{16}\) The closest he came to the issue are the following moments: Krugman expressed concern that dietary supplements were insufficiently controlled, whilst scolding fears of genetically-modified foods (3/22/00). Also, in a column critical of Ralph Nader, Krugman wrote: “When my arthritis stopped responding to over-the-counter remedies, I brought it back under control with a new regime that included the anti-inflammatory drug Feldene. But Mr. Nader’s organization Public Citizen not only tried to block Pfizer’s introduction of Feldene in the 1980’s; it also tried to get it banned in 1995, despite what was by then a firm consensus among medical experts that the drug’s benefits outweighed its risks” (7/23/00).

\(^\text{17}\) In a column subsequent to our review period, Krugman affirms FDA control and vaguely calls for more control (5/21/07).

\(^\text{18}\) The survey itself is available [here](#), and the Excel sheet containing the results is available [here](#).
The analysis and scoring is presented in the Excel sheet linked at Appendix 3, and the results are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Krugman’s Record in Treating 57 Potential Federal Reforms

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mild support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition (interventionism)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither, on balance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never addresses the issue</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Krugman claims, “I admire the virtues of free markets as much as anyone” (9/2/2003). Yet Krugman at least tacitly supports status-quo interventions, while actively supporting many new ones. Although he claims to admire free markets, in the task of elucidating their virtues, to expose the unintended consequences of a wide variety of extant interventions, Krugman, aside from the issue of international trade, has been nearly a total loss. Krugman’s silence on many of the issues, such as school vouchers, cannot be excused as ignorance. The logic of liberalization is too compelling, the import too great, the status of debate too high, that even if Krugman doubts that the liberalization would help the poor, the opportunity to address the debate and explain his doubts is overripe. The silence should be interpreted as elision. I chalk up Krugman’s illiberalism to a status-quo mentality framed by “liberal versus conservative” memes, and, more particularly, a social-democratic ethos biased towards government intervention, especially those long sanctified by “our” democratic processes.

The “left out” method could be applied to other intellectuals who present themselves as addressing the most important things. For example, Dani Rodrik (2007) has said, “I look at the world and see some government programs that work and others that fail,” yet his communication of liberal economics is meager at best. I suspect that a thorough analysis of his writings would produce results like those for Krugman. The method may be applied beyond the left, although doing so will require alterations in step with professed goals and values. Many conservatives can be shown not to care about liberty as much as they make out.
Krugman’s Posture as Being above Ideological Commitment and Bias

Krugman’s concern for poor people is secondary to his brand of public ethos. Sometimes he makes the primacy of ethos explicit, as when he writes, “The argument over Social Security privatization [is] a debate about what kind of society America should be” (3/15/05). I have demonstrated that Krugman is committed to supporting a social-democratic ethos, and that he interprets issues and information through social-democratic lenses. The demonstration has proceeded, first, by examining his affirmations of people’s-romance type collectivist sentiments and values, and secondly, by showing that the patterns of his policy judgments fit a social-democratic agenda much better than a concern for general prosperity or poor people’s interests.

The contradiction between Krugman’s ideological worldview and his supposed concern for general prosperity and poor people could be easily resolved. All Krugman would need to do is be more candid about the primacy he gives to the social-democratic ethos. There would be nothing illegitimate in declaring that, faced with the trade-offs between vying characteristics of the polity and public culture, he is willing to make the necessary sacrifices. Such a posture would be natural, candid, and coherent. Some would add, morally and intellectually defensible. Indeed, many communitarians and collectivists have openly opposed liberalism and even prosperity.

If Krugman were to declare his specific commitments and aesthetic sensibilities, it would, however, run him into a second contradiction. Krugman habitually postures as though he somehow stands above ideological commitments and biases. He casts “ideology” as an aspersion, especially at politicos and think-tank personnel. He often accuses “conservatives” etc. of being blinded by free-market or anti-government ideology (e.g., 7/26/00; 7/8/05; 1/27/06). He called the people being considered for positions in the new administration “professional ideologues, who currently earn a living by repeating conservative slogans” (12/13/00).

In contesting the notion that government purchase of private-sector assets would politicize markets Krugman says: “But that’s ideology, not analysis” (2/14/01). Krugman recurrently juxtaposes the poison of ideology with wholesomeness: “Ideology and cronyism take complete precedence over the business of governing” (5/15/06). The Clinton administration selected staff “notable more for their ability than their ideological fervor” (12/13/00). He hopes that leadership positions be staffed by “people who have made their reputations independent of their politics” (12/13/00).

Krugman naively writes as though leadership, policymaking, and discourse about the human condition can be separated from deep-seated ideological sensibilities. He especially favors academics—“academic research in economics is by and large carried out without strong political bias” (4/23/00), and he defends academia against charges of ideological bias (4/5/05). Krugman presumes that
the cultural and intellectual world that encircles him and the New York Times readership is somehow devoid of deep-seated preconceptions and commitments. He writes: “Moderates and liberals want to preserve the America FDR built. Mr. Bush and the ideological movement he leads…want to destroy it” (2/8/05). Thus, ideology is placed in contrast not only to analysis, ability, academic research, and “the business of governing,” but also to moderation and conserving “traditional social insurance programs” (5/15/06). “Liberals” like Krugman and the implied New York Times reader aren’t ideological, they’re just reasonable.

Although Krugman makes plain his partisanship and shows some candor about representing an ideology, mainly Krugman presents himself as above ideology. He never faces up to the trade-offs and commitments that go with his ideology. He scarcely acknowledges that it often sacrifices other values, including general prosperity, poor people’s interests, and liberty.

**Final Speculation: The Governing-Set Mentality**

Krugman propounds a social-democratic ethos, places undue faith in government and politics, and gives the presumption to the status quo. He opposes a classical-liberal ethos and systematically slights or elides the strong arguments for liberalization. In all that, I think Krugman is wrongheaded.

I have suggested that, in doing so, he appeals especially to the people’s romance. But is the people’s romance what steers Krugman? Yes, I suspect, to some extent. But to some extent I suspect that Krugman and many others push the people’s romance as a way of promoting the collectivism that they favor for other reasons as well. I see another kind of penchant in play, a penchant that gives rise to a mentality particularly of people of high strata who are chiefly concerned with being among what they regard to be the top of the pyramid of culture and power. Robert Nozick (1986) has suggested that “[t]he intellectual wants the whole society to be a school writ large, to be like the environment where he did so well and was so well appreciated.” Nozick suggested that “wordsmith” intellectuals resent “capitalism” for not according them the high status they come to feel entitled to from their experience in school. I am inclined to see such high-strata statist intellectuals as indulging the mythology of society as organization because that mythology gives structure and vision to the yearning to see oneself as part of the governing set—a mentality betokened in phrases like “the best and the brightest.” It is a mentality of those whose selfhood places them “near the top,” and who from such high station gaze upward. That such a penchant would be selected for in the environment of evolutionary adaptation is certainly plausible. It’s good to be the alpha male or one of his close companions. To my mind, Krugman typifies the profile. I find especially telling the enmity he holds toward

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19 As when he wrote, “it matters a lot which party is in power—and more important, which ideology” (8/18/06).
Republicans in power. He seems to resent not being among or not being able to identify with the people at the top. I suspect that Krugman’s ideological direction has been determined more by a will to see oneself a part of what one perceives to be society’s leadership than by infatuation with the people’s romance. That penchant contributes to his dedication to a kind of politics that, given his setting and personal history, serves him in pursuing such sense of self and that, by delineating and inculcating a “society” that like an organization has and requires “leadership,” accommodates the governing-set mentality itself.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Excel file containing Krugman’s 654 articles, itemization of topics, quotations of policy suggestions and judgments, and notes about Krugman’s judgments. Link. (4.75MB)


Appendix 3: Excel file containing the investigation of Krugman’s treatment of 57 potential federal liberalizations/privatizations. Link.

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**The Unofficial Paul Krugman Archive.** Link.


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