



Undoing Insularity: A Small Study of Gender Sociology's Big Problem

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[LINK TO ABSTRACT](#)

In the marketplace of ideas, competing ideas are put forth. Open debate, dialogue, and testing follow, and the best ideas win over time. Or so it is hoped.

With this short piece, I try to illustrate that gender sociology insulates its sacred beliefs from ideas that challenge those beliefs, even when the challenging ideas are very well-grounded. The sacred beliefs are to the effect that the biological differences between the sexes are minor and that the cultural differences between (or among) the genders are the result of social processes and have little basis in biological differences.

Beliefs interrelate with purposes or causes; sacred beliefs are packaged with sacred causes. Most gender sociologists have a sacred cause to reduce gender differences, as though the only gender differences that should emerge are those where physiological differences are both relevant and highly apparent, such as in sports. Gender sociologists often invoke sacred beliefs to justify social engineering. Gender sociologists tend to hold that society has fallen into a self-reinforcing trap of people 'doing gender,' and that we should support social movements and policy agendas that will free society from the trap and move us toward a state that is truer to the minimal differences between the sexes.

The challenges come from anthropology, developmental psychology, evolutionary psychology, the neurosciences, genetics, biology, and many other fields. For many decades now researchers have amassed findings that suggest that the differences between the sexes go far beyond the obvious physical and biological differences. Differences in competitiveness, aggression, sexual interest, risk beha-

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avior, and many other traits are found again and again, as are differences in brain physiology and neuroimaging, and are supported by many different methods and approaches.² It is blinkered to presuppose, without question, that we are blank slates inhering within bodies that just happen to have anatomical differences.

The infamous Larry Summers incident—in which Summers suggested that, even if means are equal, a difference in variance in ability could explain why males dominate the top of a field (Summers 2005)—points up how minor differences between distributions can explain striking differences in outcomes (see Johnson et al. 2008; Wai et al. 2012; Madison 2016). It also illustrates how the pertinent and perfectly innocent remarks of a Harvard University president can trigger the wrath of people enmeshed in sacred beliefs and taboos.³

Taboo is an inevitable aspect of social systems, but taboos may interfere with intellectual endeavors because they limit inquiry and challenge. It is time to work out improved attitudes about gender, attitudes that accept that differences between the genders may continue to exist even in settings where individuals are freer to express themselves and lead their own lives.

The present investigation is informed by my long and ongoing experience as a sociologist at Stockholm University. My teaching and research often touch on gender issues. I have served on about five thesis committees that addressed gender sociology or related matters, and I have participated in dozens of seminars that touch on gender sociology. My relationships with my colleagues and students are not heated. When I raise ideas that would challenge the sacred beliefs, I do so only at the edges. I have seen how people react when I or another suggests that maybe there is a difference in math skills between men and women, or that men and women have different preferences and motivations. In my experience, gender sociologists frown upon such remarks about innate differences in aptitude or motivations. I perceive deep and widespread taboo and insularity among gender sociologists. It saddens me. I feel impelled to make available some expression of my




Figure 1. A horse with blinkers, to limit the range of its vision (photo courtesy bitlessbridle.com)

2. The literatures on differences between male and female are vast. Pinker (2002, 337–371) provides an introduction, but the literatures have grown since then. For more recent discussions, I recommend, for example, Campbell (2013) and the work of David C. Geary ([link](#)). In a forthcoming book chapter (Stern 2017, available now as a working paper) I deal with some of the literatures that relate to gender and labor-market outcomes.

3. The Harvard faculty drove Summers out of his position as president of the university. On sacred beliefs and taboo in the social sciences, see Duarte et al. 2015; Haidt 2012; Tetlock 2003.

concern, hoping that students and others will hear it before sinking into the sacred beliefs and sacred causes addressed here.⁴

Reading Pinker

Shortly after it appeared in 2002, I read Steven Pinker's *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature*. I found it somewhat polemical. For example, Pinker writes of gender feminism:

[G]ender feminism is an empirical doctrine committed to three claims about human nature. The first is that the differences between men and women have nothing to do with biology but are socially constructed in their entirety. The second is that humans possess a single social motive—power—and that social life can be understood only in terms of how it is exercised. The third is that human interactions arise not from the motives of people dealing with each other as individuals but from the motives of *groups* dealing with other groups—in this case, the male gender dominating the female gender. (Pinker 2002, 341, emphasis in original)

Still, I was impressed by the enormous amount of modern research summarized by Pinker (2002, 337–371). Gender is one of the chief topics of the book. I found its criticism of the notion that differences between the sexes are minor to be overwhelmingly persuasive.

Controversies over gender pit 'nature' mechanisms—sometimes expressed in terms of 'innate,' 'instinct,' 'essence,' 'genetic,' 'biological,' and 'evolutionary'—against 'nurture' mechanisms—sometimes expressed in terms of 'environment,' 'social construction,' 'culture,' 'custom,' 'stereotypes,' 'discrimination,' 'social forces,' 'power,' 'domination,' and 'oppression.' Most people give weight to both nature and nurture. But the distinctions are subtle and often problematic. Is pregnancy nature or nurture? As for 'social construction,' all social practice, even all cognition, can be seen as socially constructed. What matters, practically, are the conditions and bounds bearing on what gets constructed, and what improvements might result from new insights, new attitudes, new institutions, and so on. Yes, observed work-life balances arise in part from social constructs, but wouldn't any balance? The real issue is whether improvements are available to us, where 'improvement' accounts for the negative as well as the positive consequences of the change.

4. For related investigations, see Horowitz et al. 2014; Winegard et al. 2014.

Gender sociology often seems to presuppose not only that sex differences are minor, but that social existence is highly malleable (particularly by social engineering) and that better social constructs are readily available. I think that those presuppositions are dubious, and I am unsympathetic to social engineering by government. Even if Pinker sometimes paints his opponents with a broad brush, his arguments against those three sacred presuppositions—little difference between the sexes, the malleability of social existence, and the availability of better social constructs—are powerful and backed up by a great deal of scholarly research. Since 2002 the literatures have continued to explode with further findings.

Pinker's 2002 review of the scientific literatures received tremendous attention in scholarly and popular sources, and Pinker made a number of highly viewed videos presenting his ideas (e.g., 1, 2, 3). If gender sociologists remained unexposed to the challenge that Pinker represented, it could only be from their own determination to remain unexposed. The exploration undertaken here examines the extent to which gender sociology has, in the years since the publication of *The Blank Slate*, acknowledged, discussed, or evaluated findings that challenge its presuppositions regarding differences between the sexes, the malleability of social existence, and availability of better social constructs.

A word about terminology: I am going to use the expression *biological-difference ideas* to refer to the large cluster of ideas, evidence, contentions, evolutionary theories, and so on that suggest that males and females are more than incidentally different in their distributions of aptitudes, potentialities, inclinations, and motivations, as well as a sensitivity to the fact that sometimes, as Thomas Schelling (1978) taught about segregation, small differences in hard-to-observe characteristics can give rise to significant differences in the easily observed outcome patterns. So 'biological-difference ideas' is here an abbreviation for all such challenges to the sacred beliefs of gender sociology. I will grade a sample of papers with respect to whether they are blinkered from biological-difference ideas.⁵

“Doing Gender”

I was invited to contribute to a volume on how political ideology blinkers scholarship, and I wrote a critique of sociological research on gender and labor markets (Stern 2017). That critique also addresses the sacred beliefs and taboos addressed here. But I wanted to test my own impression, so I devised a small inves-

5. Wordplay tempts us to write 'blinkered from Pinker,' which is especially apt because Steven Pinker's sister Susan Pinker insightfully expounds how biological-difference ideas play out in personal careers and the workplace, notably in *The Sexual Paradox: Men, Women, and the Real Gender Gap* (2009).

tigation, resulting in the present study. It is intended as a simple empirical test of the claim that gender sociology really is blinkered and insular in the matter of biological differences between the sexes.

I investigate a set of articles that cite “Doing Gender” by Candace West and Don Zimmerman (1987), a classic in gender studies. After having been rejected at journals for almost ten years prior to its publication, the success of “Doing Gender” is striking (Wickes and Emmison 2007). It is the most-cited article ever published in *Gender & Society*, the top journal in the subfield as well as a leading journal in sociology generally (Jurik and Siemsen 2009). It has been described as “groundbreaking” (Ridgeway 2009, 146; Deutsch 2007, 106). In 2009, a symposium in *Gender & Society* was dedicated to celebrating it and discussing its contribution (see Jurik and Siemsen 2009 and articles in that issue).⁶ As of late September 2016, it had 2,374 Web of Science citations and 8,960 Google Scholar citations.

West and Zimmerman develop the idea of “doing gender” to “advance a new understanding of gender as a routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction” (1987, 125). They distinguish between a person’s sex and his or her gender. The sex designation is made through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for female or male classification, such as genitalia or chromosomal typing before birth. One’s sex places the person in a sex category. Gender is the enactment of one’s sex category in all social situations (ibid., 127). The person, in West and Zimmerman’s view, is “doing” a gender construct. “Doing gender means creating differences between girls and boys and women and men, differences that are not natural, essential, or biological” (137). One’s sex category is “omnirelevant,” and we can “never really not ‘do gender’ as long as society is partitioned by ‘essential’ differences between women and men and placement in a sex category is both relevant and enforced” (137). “[I]he ‘doing’ of gender is undertaken by women and men whose competence as members of society is hostage to its production” (126). “[G]ender is an emergent feature of social situations; both as an outcome of and a rationale for various social arrangements and as a means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of society” (126).

In “Doing Gender” biological differences are, if only by implication, narrowed to genitalia and chromosomes (West and Zimmerman 1987, 127). Those differences are treated as rather incidental, like one’s height. But in social life, “sex category is used as a fundamental criterion for differentiation,” and so “doing gender is unavoidable” (ibid., 145). One naturally reads West and Zimmerman as wishing to diminish ‘doing gender,’ even to eliminate it entirely, on grounds that it is not based on any really important differences between the sexes. ‘Doing gender’

6. Smith (2009) is one symposium contributor who argues that to make sense of gender differences biology must be incorporated.

is presented as part of a lamentable system of social control. The paper's final paragraph reads:

Gender is a powerful ideological device, which produces, reproduces, and legitimates the choices and limits that are predicated on sex category. An understanding of how gender is produced in social situations will afford clarification of the interactional scaffolding of social structure and the social control processes that sustain it. (West and Zimmerman 1987, 147)

Twenty-three articles that cite “Doing Gender,” 2004–2014

“Doing Gender” was published in 1987. In a post-Pinker world, it seems reasonable to think that “Doing Gender” understated the importance of biological difference. Has gender sociology been learning from the vast scientific literatures that were summarized by Pinker in 2002 and that have since further expanded?

In December 2015, using the Social Science Citations Index (SSCI), I compiled articles that cite “Doing Gender.” I included in my search those articles with “sociology” marked as a topic and that were published between 2004 and 2014. I then sorted the articles from most highly cited to least. I picked the two most highly cited articles for each year. Of the 23 articles,⁷ nine were published in *Gender & Society* and six were published in general sociology journals such as *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, or *Annual Review of Sociology*. There is a good mix, then, of articles in mainstream sociology and articles in the subfield of gender sociology. There is also a good mix of literature overviews and empirical investigations.⁸

The citing of “Doing Gender” is merely my means of drawing a pertinent sample of papers dealing with gender differences and gender outcomes. Some of the 23 articles cite “Doing Gender” in a passing way, and some cite it ceremonially,⁹ but even most of those are dealing with gender differences or outcomes and, in

7. My sample contains 23 articles, rather than 22, because three articles were included for 2014: Two articles were tied for second place in citations.

8. I categorized nine articles as theoretical contributions, literature reviews, or evaluative discussions of the state of the literature. The other fourteen articles were empirical investigations; four used a quantitative approach, nine used qualitative approaches (analysis of interviews, newspaper reporting), and one article used both.

9. Of the 23 articles, I would say that the ‘doing gender’ concept is core to the formulations or investigations of eight articles, those being: Deutsch 2007; Bolton and Muzio 2008; Schilt and Westbrook 2009; Rhoton 2011; Miller 2011; McLaughlin et al. 2012; Jenness and Fenstermaker 2014; and Westbrook and

my opinion, should address biological-difference ideas. In my review, I coded just three articles as not relevant to the matter investigated (LaRossa 2005; Messerschmidt 2012; Moen et al. 2013), meaning that they do not deal with matters for which biological-difference ideas would clearly be relevant.¹⁰

TABLE 1. Classification of 23 articles citing “Doing Gender”

Article	Biological-difference ideas mentioned?	Overall grade
Ridgeway and Correll (2004, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	No	Blinkered
Risman (2004, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	Yes, but dismissive	Blinkered
Breen and Cooke (2005, <i>European Sociological Review</i>)	No	Neutral
LaRossa (2005, <i>Journal of Marriage and Family</i>)	Not relevant	N.A.
Hook (2006, <i>American Sociological Review</i>)	No	Neutral
Raley and Bianchi (2006, <i>Annual Review of Sociology</i>)	Yes	Unblinkered
Deutsch (2007, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	No	Blinkered
Schippers (2007, <i>Theory and Society</i>)	No	Blinkered
Noone and Stephens (2008, <i>Sociology of Health and Illness</i>)	Yes, but dismissive	Blinkered
Bolton and Muzio (2008, <i>Work, Employment & Society</i>)	Yes, but dismissive	Blinkered
Ridgeway (2009, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	No	Blinkered
Schilt and Westbrook (2009, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	Yes, but dismissive	Blinkered
England (2010, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	No	Blinkered
Hook (2010, <i>American Journal of Sociology</i>)	No	Neutral
Rhoton (2011, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	No	Blinkered
Miller (2011, <i>Sociology</i>)	Yes, but dismissive	Blinkered
Messerschmidt (2012, <i>Men and Masculinities</i>)	Not relevant	N.A.
McLaughlin et al. (2012, <i>American Sociological Review</i>)	No	Blinkered
Dworkin et al. (2013, <i>Men and Masculinities</i>)	No	Blinkered
Moen et al. (2013, <i>Work and Occupations</i>)	Not relevant	N.A.
Jenness and Fenstermaker (2014, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	No	Neutral
Young et al. (2014, <i>Society and Mental Health</i>)	No	Blinkered
Westbrook and Schilt (2014, <i>Gender & Society</i>)	No	Blinkered

Table 1 lists the articles. I read all of the articles and developed a spreadsheet with quotations and my own observations. After completing the spreadsheet I did a thorough word search on *essen**, *evolut**, and *biolog** to make sure that I did not miss

Schilt 2014. For discussion of core usage versus peripheral or ceremonial citations, see Wickes and Emmison 2007; Messerschmidt 2012.

10. LaRossa (2005) mentions “Doing Gender” as one example of researchers translating nouns (gender) into verbs (engender, doing gender) when developing concepts and variables. Messerschmidt (2012) refers to “Doing Gender” as one concept appropriated by academia. Moen, Lam, Ammons, and Kelly (2013) discuss “Doing Gender” as part of an analogy within their discussion of how professional workers manage time.

any mention of biological-difference ideas; the results of this word search form an online appendix ([link](#)).

In the second column of Table 1, a coding of “No” indicates that biological-difference ideas are missing. The coding “Yes, but dismissive” indicates that the article brings up biological-difference ideas to dismiss them as unimportant. The coding “Yes” indicates that biological-difference ideas are treated in the article.

In the third column I assign overall grades to the papers: “unblinkered,” “neutral,” or “blinkered.” These scores are based not only on whether biological-difference ideas are mentioned (as indicated in column 2) but also on how pertinent biological-difference ideas are to the discussion and how responsibly they are treated. Of the 20 papers, 15 were scored “blinkered,” four “neutral,” and only one, “unblinkered,” illustrating that gender sociology does insulate itself from the challenge of biological-difference ideas.

In an online appendix ([link](#)) I provide a spreadsheet giving quotations from each article and my reasons for grading as I did the article’s treatment of biological-difference ideas. In what follows here I offer sundry remarks about some of the articles.

One article graded unblinkered

One article, by Sara Raley and Suzanne Bianchi (2006), includes biological-difference ideas and the interaction between biology and culture in their literature review on whether the gender of children in Western societies has bearing on family processes such as divorce, educational savings, time spent with children, etc. They cite “Doing Gender” in a sentence where they talk about notions of gender differences being constructed. Hence, ‘doing gender’ is not a core concept in their review. Overall, the article is exemplary in bringing in both ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ explanations to bear on their topic. The result is a nuanced discussion of causality. The article is also exemplary in discussing the publication bias of statistical significance, arguing that studies finding no differences in treatment of children are less likely to be published. They conclude:

Often insufficient attention is paid, both in study designs and in the interpretation of findings, to the ways that sons’ and daughters’ behaviors may differ, on average, and may thus motivate differential treatment by parents. Yet, children are active coconstructors of their universe. Greater attention to the ways in which sons and daughters elicit or reinforce differential parental investments is a topic worthy of more serious sociological attention than it has been given to date. (Raley and Bianchi 2006, 417)

Four articles graded neutral

Four articles were graded as neutral. Three of those do not include discussion of biological-difference ideas per se, but they include discussions about gender differences that allow for more active gender differences (Breen and Cooke 2005; Hook 2006; 2010). Richard Breen and Lynne Prince Cooke (2005) investigate gender differences in preferences (citing Hakim 2000) using a game theory model. In two articles, Jennifer Hook (2006; 2010) discusses household choices, and in treating gender inequality she briefly discusses explanations other than male oppression. Hook cites literature on maternal gatekeeping and women wanting to maintain control over the household (2006, 655). The fourth article (Jeness and Fenstermaker 2014) deals with transgender prison inmates; I do not see how including biological-difference ideas would have added value to its arguments.

Fifteen articles graded blinkered

In remarking on the articles I coded as blinkered, let me begin with five articles, “Unpacking the Gender System” (Ridgeway and Correll 2004), “Gender as a Social Structure” (Risman 2004), “Undoing Gender” (Deutsch 2007), “The Gender Revolution: Uneven and Stalled” (England 2010), and “Framed Before We Know It” (Ridgeway 2009), each written by high-profile gender scholars and published in *Gender & Society*. In theoretical expositions on gender, it is clear that biological-difference ideas are pertinent, and given that these scholars are experts on the topic I find the articles blinkered. Only Barbara Risman (2004) mentions the existence of biological-difference ideas. She does so in her overview of how the gender tradition evolved: “The first tradition [to explain gender] focuses on how individual sex differences originate, whether biological (Udry 2000) or social in origin (Bem 1993)” (Risman 2004, 430). Risman also mentions personality differences as mattering in equal sharing households (*ibid.*, 440). But in her conclusion, she takes a firm stance against invoking biology:

There is no reason, except the transitional vertigo that will accompany the processes to dismantle it, that a utopian vision of a just world involves any gender structure at all. Why should we need to elaborate on the biological distinction between the sexes? We must accommodate reproductive differences for the process of biological replacement, but there is no a priori reason we should accept any other role differentiation simply based on biological sex category. Before accepting any gender elaboration around biological sex category, we ought to search suspiciously for the possibly subtle ways such differentiation supports men’s privilege. (Risman 2004, 446)

Risman seems to be addressing evolutionary critics, indirectly, and dismissing them.

Eight other articles graded as blinkered treat gender differences of various kinds, where biological-difference ideas are pertinent but missing. The eight articles are empirical and most use interviews that are interpreted in a 'doing gender' framework. In my short review of the articles, I use the wording of the authors in order to maintain as true a representation of the content as possible.

The article by Laura Rhoton (2011) is titled "Distancing as a Gendered Barrier: Understanding Women Scientists' Gender Practices." Interviews with female STEM academics are analyzed in order to understand why engaging in "feminine practices" in an environment that values "masculine practices" may undermine legitimacy, as femininity is subordinate to masculinity (Rhoton 2011, 707). Her interviewees perceive average gender differences; women as a group tend to take criticism or disagreement personally, and are more prone to jealousy, passive aggressiveness, and giggling (*ibid.*, 702–703). Professional socialization, developing thick skin, objectivity, and assertiveness are interpreted as masculine behaviors that reproduce a masculine culture, hence keeping the gender system intact. The biological-difference ideas put forth in the interviews are interpreted as reflecting "an essentialist framing of gender" and are dismissed since feminine characteristics can be suppressed and overcome through professional socialization (*ibid.*, 703).

Four of the articles focus on males. Male behaviors are interpreted as enactments of masculinity and expressions of seeking power and dominance over women. For instance, Heather McLaughlin, Christopher Uggen, and Amy Blackstone (2012) address sexual harassment by men, suggesting that women in power are more likely to be harassed because men will use harassment as a tool to police appropriately gendered behavior. Other articles are more focused on masculinity itself, a bit less in relation to women (Dworkin, Hatcher, Colvin, and Peacock 2013; Noone and Stephens 2008; Miller 2011) but share a conceptualization of males and masculinity lacking any recognition of biological-difference ideas.

Two articles study experiences of transgender individuals (Schilt and Westbrook 2009; Westbrook and Schilt 2014). Laurel Westbrook and Kristen Schilt (2014) use "Doing Gender" as a conceptual framework to understand social processes of gender determination. They discuss biology-based determination of gender vs. identity-based determination of gender in the context of sex segregated public space (bathrooms, competitive sports) and transgender individuals. Obviously, biological sex is not relevant as gender identity is at the core of investigation. But biological-difference ideas would be pertinent in interpreting reactions to transgender individuals by cisgender men and women. For instance, in discussing transgender athletes, Westbrook and Schilt write:

In June 2012, the IOC [International Olympic Committee] ... [stated] that athletes competing as women cannot have a testosterone level “within the male range” unless it “does not confer a competitive advantage...,” thus minimizing what is viewed as an unfair hormonal advantage. These explicit criteria allow the IOC to incorporate trans and intersex athletes, and thus to validate the liberal moment of gender, without challenging the premise that modern competitive athletics rests on: the presumption that there are two genders and all athletes must be put into one of those two categories for competition. (Westbrook and Schilt 2014, 41; one citation omitted)

The authors seem to treat hormonal differences and their impact on sports as unreal and the IOC’s insistence that testosterone can yield an advantage as following from a simplistic binary notion of gender. They go on to state that:

While transwomen might self-identify as women, people who subscribed to biology-based ideologies of gender view these athletes as males who carry a size and strength advantage over females. (Westbrook and Schilt 2014, 41)

I think that biological-difference ideas could have added value to this discussion.

At root, these fifteen articles are graded as blinkered because I find that insulation from, or avoidance of, biological-difference ideas damages the quality of reasoning on display. Any one of these studies would be improved by discussing well-established average gender differences in agreeableness, competitiveness, aggression, sexual interest, and risk behavior.¹¹

Conclusion

I generated a sample of 23 well-cited articles that themselves cite the landmark article “Doing Gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987), and then effectively reduced that sample to 20 by removing three that were not substantially relevant to the matters addressed in “Doing Gender.” Of these 20, only one article aptly engages with the literature on biological-difference ideas, to which Pinker (2002) drew such great attention. Four articles were relevant but deemed neutral, meaning that I concluded biological-difference ideas would not clearly add value to their authors’ arguments. Fifteen of the 20 articles, however, discuss gender issues in a manner that is blinkered from biological-difference ideas. Had these 15 articles been informed by biological-difference ideas, they would have provided added value to sociological discourse. One cannot draw quantitative estimates on the ba-

11. For further detail on my review of the articles, see Appendix 2.

sis of my investigation, but its findings are consistent with an image of gender sociology as a subfield that has insulated its sacred beliefs from important scientific challenges.

I have extensive first-hand experience with gender sociology's insularity. But I also know of pervasive preference falsification (Kuran 1995), and I have seen students awaken with an 'a-ha!' moment when exposed to unorthodox thinkers such as Catherine Hakim (1995; 2000; 2008). I believe reform is possible. Whether people should 'do gender' less, and how they should 'do gender,' are questions worthy of personal reflection, scholarly exploration, and public discourse. More definite, to my mind, is that people should do less insularity.

Appendices

Appendix 1: A file showing the work, based on SSCI citations, done to arrive at the articles that formed my sample of 23 articles that cite "Doing Gender." [[download](#)]

Appendix 2: A spreadsheet I used to record relevant quotations and notes when grading the 23 articles' treatments of biological-difference ideas. [[download](#)]

Appendix 3: The results of my searches of the article texts for *essen**, *evolut**, and *biolog**, which were done to check that I hadn't missed any treatment of biological-difference ideas. [[download](#)]

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