This paper argues against a supernatural interpretation of Adam Smith’s impartial spectator in favor of a more naturalistic one indicative of the fallibilistic limits of the human imagination. It is an invited response to Klein, Swanson, and Young (2025), which favors an opposing account, one that postulates God or a God-like grounding for the normative judgment the impartial spectator provides. The discussion centers on the theology-laden language of The Theory of Moral Sentiments but calls upon Smith’s other work when relevant. It presents conceptual, biographical, terminological, exegetical, and political objections, in that order. The final two sections argue that the current philosophical disagreement is an exemplar of the longstanding debate as to whether one should read theological texts literally or metaphorically, and that Smith’s works should be read metaphorically. The paper concludes by showing that Smith himself offered an explanation as to why he used theological language despite not actually relying upon it for his moral psychology.